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Politicians’ Role in Foreign Policy Making 
in Japan before the Central Government 
Reform
The decision–making process in Japan has been characterized by extensive 
powers possessed by the bureaucrats who often overshadowed their political 
superiors. Foreign policy making was not an exception. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA) boasted strong control over Japan’s diplomacy. While the role of 
civil servants was theoretically limited to the implementation of the decisions 
made by politicians, in reality the administrative staff used a  range of infor-
mal sources of power to act as arbiters of state matters. Only after the entry 
into force of Hashimoto’s administrative reform in 2001 did top–level decision 
makers gain new institutional tools that helped them to conduct an independ-
ent foreign policy on a more regular basis. Without denying this conventional 
wisdom, I argue that the politicians could occasionally play a significant role in 
Japan’s diplomacy even before implementation of institutional changes at the 
beginning of the 21st century. Under special circumstances, prime ministers, 
chief cabinet secretaries and foreign ministers were able to exert a considerable 
influence on the course of foreign policy, sometimes even changing its direction. 
Up to the 1990s the most influential figures in the government had enough 
authority to overcome the domination of the bureaucrats and impose their own 
will on MOFA. 
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1. Introduction
The topic of Japanese politicians’ role in foreign policy making has 
been seldom explored by researchers. Up to the 1990s the heads of gov-
ernment and their closest entourages were considered as largely passive in 
this area, which explains why scholars preferred to focus on the activity of 
MOFA bureaucrats or simply perceive Japan as a country subservient to 
the interests of the United States (US). Foreign media used to even mock 
that before participating in summit meetings Japanese premiers received 
only three instructions from MOFA: not to say anything, to smile in front 
of cameras, and not to be late for the flight home (Shima 2000, p. 168). 
Only when the central government reform entered into force in 2001 did 
it shed new light on the prime minister’s prerogatives in all legislative 
spheres. The head of government gained the right to independently an-
nounce new policies during cabinet meetings, the Cabinet Secretariat was 
allowed to lead drafting of important national policies, and the Cabinet 
Office (Naikakufu) was established to support the endeavors of front-
benchers of the ruling party. As a result, the first comprehensive analyses 
on the head of government’s role in diplomacy and security issues started 
appearing in Japan (for example: Shinoda 2007).
I argue that while the central government reform indeed enabled the 
prime minister to play an active role in foreign policy making more easi-
ly, under special conditions Japanese politicians had already been able to 
exert a considerable influence on diplomacy even before the revolutionary 
institutional changes. 
The approach of veto players has often been used to explain informal 
constraints to the role played by cabinet members in decision making in 
Japan. As defined by George Tsebelis, a veto player is “an individual or col-
lective actor whose agreement is required for a policy decision.” (Tsebelis 
1995, p. 293) In the Cold War era both bureaucracy and interest groups 
connected with influential figures in the ruling party often hindered gov-
ernmental plans regarding foreign policy. Nevertheless, prime ministers, 
chief cabinet secretaries and foreign ministers could use a range of strate-
gies to overcome the resistance against new policies. Thanks to the strong 
position as faction bosses, cordial relations with the bureaucrats, inter-
ministerial coordination skills or vast experience in international affairs, 
the frontbenchers were occasionally able to bend the institutional con-
straints and direct Japan’s diplomacy to new paths. In the article I give 
75Politicians’ Role in Foreign Policy Making in Japan...
short examples of prime ministers, chief cabinet secretaries and foreign 
ministers who managed to exceed the traditional framework of foreign 
policy making despite the lack of institutional tools introduced by the 
central government reform.
2. Prime Ministers as Supreme Decision Makers 
in Foreign Policy
On paper, Japanese prime ministers enjoyed broad prerogatives. As 
the heads of government they nominated and dismissed cabinet mem-
bers and acted as superior decision makers in all legislative fields. Serv-
ing concurrently as presidents of the ruling party, they theoretically had 
a majority of lawmakers in the Diet under their control. Additionally, they 
possessed the right to dissolve the House of Representatives, which gave 
them a formidable tool to exert pressure on opposition parties. Despite 
these formal prerogatives, however, Japanese prime ministers rarely were 
able to display a  strong top–down leadership. After all, they had to ca-
ter for maintaining harmony between various factions in the ruling party 
and keep balance between distinct ministries that were actually ruled by 
the bureaucrats. As pointed out by Hayao (1993, pp. 184–210), Japanese 
prime ministers could be called reactive leaders, because instead of impos-
ing their own policy vision on other political actors, they usually merely 
supervised the enactment of issues decided upon by their subordinates in 
the bureaucracy or ruling party. Foreign policy left little more space for the 
prime ministers’ individual initiatives than other legislative fields, but in 
reality it was subject to the same constraints as domestic policy making.
Nevertheless, prime ministers could use two sources of power that en-
abled them to play a more active role in formulating foreign policy than the 
institutional constraints would normally allow. Thanks to extensive person-
al connections in the bureaucracy and ruling party they were sometimes able 
to overcome the resistance of both veto players. Equally effective was relying 
by the prime ministers on popular support in promotion of their initiatives. 
Figures who were powerful enough to take advantage of any of these two 
tactics rarely became heads of government, but when they did, they enjoyed 
more freedom in foreign policy making than other prime ministers. Prime 
Minister Tanaka Kakuei effectively used the former strategy in 1972–1974, 
and Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro the latter in 1982–1987.
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When Tanaka Kakuei assumed office in 1972, he declared that one of 
the main goals of his government would be to normalize diplomatic rela-
tions with the People’s Republic of China. Despite US President Richard 
Nixon’s visit to Beijing in February 1972, it was a difficult task to achieve. 
Not only did influential pro–Taiwan groups in the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) object to abandoning official recognition of the Guomindang 
regime, but also MOFA bureaucrats were extremely reluctant to agree to 
such a sudden policy shift. As a result, Tanaka had to impose his will on 
both veto players.
Because Japan had maintained official diplomatic contacts with the 
government in Taipei for two decades, MOFA civil servants were deter-
mined to protect the status quo. However, Tanaka Kakuei boasted strong 
influences among the bureaucrats. He was famous for the fact that he 
ordered his secretaries to constantly gather personal data on the admin-
istrative staff. This extensive database enabled Tanaka to send gifts to 
bureaucrats on different occasions, for example to congratulate them on 
the birth of a  child (Fukuoka 2011, pp. 58–59). Tanaka found an ally 
in MOFA particularly in the person of China Division Director–General 
Hashimoto Hiroshi. Soon after the Nixon shock Tanaka, who was the 
LDP secretary general at that time, entrusted to Hashimoto the task to 
prepare a report on the feasibility of normalizing diplomatic relations with 
Beijing. Thanks to Hashimoto’s full support, the prime minister managed 
to force MOFA to cooperate (Hayasaka 1993, pp. 401–409).
As the leader of one of the biggest LDP factions, Tanaka Kakuei boast-
ed as strong connections in the ruling party as among bureaucrats. In 
order to discuss the problem in the LDP, he established the Conference 
on the Normalization of Japan–China Relations (Nitchū Kokkō Seijōka 
Kyōgikai). It was attended by 249 out of 431 LDP lawmakers (Hayasa-
ka 1993, p. 415). Thanks to this move the prime minister bypassed the 
jurisdiction of other LDP decision–making bodies (Zhao 1999, p. 99). 
The proceedings of the Conference were violent, but through backstage 
persuasion Tanaka mitigated the right wing’s resistance to some extent 
(Hayasaka 1993, p. 419; Huang 2006, pp. 74–75). Eventually, the Confer-
ence authorized the normalization of diplomatic relations with Mainland 
China upon the condition of the continuation of hitherto relations with 
Taiwan (Tamura, Tomashima & Koeda 2000, pp. 161–162; Hayasaka 
1993, pp. 419–420). The ambiguous term “hitherto relations” (jūrai no 
kankei) was coined by the Tanaka camp in order to maintain intraparty 
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harmony despite a  lack of consensus on the China issue. According to 
the pro–Taiwan faction, it meant the maintenance of diplomatic relations 
with Taipei, but the prime minister later claimed it only obliged the gov-
ernment to pursue unofficial contacts with Taiwan. Lulled by this equiv-
ocal expression, the pro–Taiwan lawmakers eased their protests against 
Tanaka’s visit to Beijing until it was too late. 
Thanks to the skilful pacification of both MOFA bureaucrats and 
anti–mainstream politicians of the ruling party, Tanaka Kakuei achieved 
a breakthrough in Japanese foreign policy that would have been otherwise 
impossible in such a short period of time. After only three months in of-
fice, Tanaka visited Beijing at the end of September 1972. Together with 
Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, he signed a Joint Communiqué that 
regulated bilateral relations after the normalization of official contacts. 
Both sides exchanged ambassadors, Japan expressed deep remorse for war 
atrocities as well as recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as 
the sole legal government of China, and China, in return, renounced its 
right for war indemnities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 1972).
While Tanaka relied on extensive connections with the bureaucrats 
and backbenchers, Nakasone Yasuhiro managed to exert strong influence 
on foreign policy thanks to maintaining a high popularity among the pub-
lic. When he became prime minister in 1982, he served as a leader of one 
of smaller factions in the LDP and would not have had a chance to win the 
LDP presidential election without the support from Tanaka. As a result, 
Nakasone was initially perceived as Tanaka’s “puppet.” Despite this fact, 
he gradually strengthened his position as a supreme decision maker by 
appealing directly to the public and distancing himself from Tanaka. 
According to Yomiuri Shinbun opinion polls, Nakasone started his 
premiership in 1982 with a 40.1 percent support rate, and he ended his 
long tenure in 1987 with the support of 48.8 percent of respondents (Yo-
miuri Shinbunsha Yoron Chōsabu 2002, pp. 488–489). Nakasone’s pop-
ularity explains why he gained leverage over both the ruling party and 
bureaucrats. He used his position to conduct the privatization of Japan 
Railway, but also to strengthen an alliance with the US. By emphasizing 
the military aspect of cooperation with the US government, Nakasone 
went one step further in interpreting the security policy of Japan than 
had been allowed by the Yoshida Doctrine.1 After assuming office he an-
1 The Yoshida Doctrine referred to a set of policies pursued by Prime Minister Yoshida 
Shigeru (1946–1947, 1948–1954). They encompassed the renunciation of immediate 
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nounced “general settlement of post–war politics” (sengo seiji no sōkes-
san), which meant a “revision of hitherto basic systems and mechanisms 
without treating them as taboos.” (Nakasone 2004, p. 171) In January 
1983 Nakasone paid a visit to Washington, where he told President Ron-
ald Reagan that Japan and the US were “a community of fate” and that 
Japan could be called “an unsinkable aircraft carrier” against the Soviet 
invasion (Nakasone 2004, p. 174). These words were much more far–go-
ing than the balanced stance of MOFA bureaucrats. In order to strengthen 
position of Japan in the alliance with the US, Nakasone used his high 
rates of support to impose on the bureaucrats and the ruling party a de-
cision to exceed a one–percent GNP limit on military expenses as well 
as allow export of military technology to the US. Moreover, Nakasone 
played an active role in the investigation of the Korean Air Lines Flight 
007 crash in 1983. A Japanese listening post intercepted communications 
of Soviet fighter pilots with a command centre on Sakhalin Island, which 
proved that the airliner was shot down by the Soviets. As the release of 
this recording would compromise the Japanese secret security outpost, 
it was vehemently opposed by MOFA, Defense Agency and the Ministry 
of Justice. Nevertheless, Nakasone did not bend to the pressure from the 
bureaucrats, and he independently decided to disclose the transcripts at 
an emergency session of the UN Security Council (Nakasone 2004, pp. 
165–185).
Nevertheless, even without Tanaka–like connections or Nakasone–
like popularity, the prime ministers were sometimes able to exert some in-
fluence on foreign policy if they only were determined enough to promote 
their ideals. For example, Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi (1994–
1996) managed to leave as his legacy a statement in which he apologized 
to East Asian countries for war atrocities. Though Murayama had the sup-
port from MOFA in this regard, he had to break the resistance from con-
servative LDP politicians. When the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) formed 
a government together with the LDP in 1994, issuing explicit apologies 
on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Japan’s surrender that ended 
the Second World War on August 15, 1945, became one of the points of 
the coalition agreement. Nevertheless, a parliamentary resolution on this 
issue was watered down due to pressure from rightist organizations. Ig-
remilitarization of Japan after the Second World War, maintenance of alliance with 
the US as protector of Japanese territory and focus on achieving a high rate of econom-
ic growth.
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noring the protests from nationalists, Murayama decided to make up for 
this failure by issuing a separate statement. Seeing the determination of 
the prime minister, none of right–wing ministers dared to object, and the 
statement was adopted unanimously as a cabinet decision on August 15, 
1995 (Murayama & Sataka 2009, pp. 30–32).
The examples of Tanaka, Nakasone and, to a  lesser extent, Muray-
ama, confirm that under special circumstances Japanese prime ministers 
were able to impose their will on the bureaucrats and ruling parties even 
before the enactment of the central government reform. It is connections 
with the two kinds of veto players, high popularity among the public 
and determination in being faithful to one’s ideological convictions that 
helped the heads of government to overcome the institutional constraints 
to foreign policy making.
3. Chief Cabinet Secretaries as Crucial 
Interministerial Coordination Actors
Chief cabinet secretaries were often dubbed as “wives” of heads of the 
government (Bochorodycz 2010, p. 31), because they usually recruited from 
among the most trusted associates of the prime minister. They served as 
spokespersons of the cabinet, supervised the activity of the Cabinet Secre-
tariat as well as oversaw a general policy coordination between all ministries 
and between the government and the ruling party. Despite a relatively broad 
range of responsibilities, chief cabinet secretaries usually stayed not only 
in the shadow of the prime ministers they served, but also in the shadow 
of their bureaucratic subordinates. In reality it were administrative deputy 
chief cabinet secretaries who played the crucial role of seeking a consensus 
on difficult policy matters between all the involved ministries.
Nevertheless, chief cabinet secretaries could still play an important 
role in foreign policy making, provided they possessed enough experience 
in conducting consensus–seeking activities, both in bureaucracy and the 
ruling party. The most exemplary was Gotōda Masaharu who served as 
chief cabinet secretary under the Nakasone cabinet in 1982–1983 and 
1985–1987. As a former bureaucrat and a former administrative deputy 
chief cabinet secretary, Gotōda boasted vast knowledge of bureaucratic 
procedures and strong connections with the administrative staff of many 
ministries. At the same time, he was an influential politician of the Tana-
ka faction that remained the largest group in the LDP throughout the 
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1980s. Thanks to his extensive connections among the bureaucrats and 
politicians, Gotōda was dubbed “razor” (kamisori) by the media (Kikuchi 
2013, pp. 116–120).
In order to enable a  more active policy coordination by the prime 
minister and his closest entourage, Gotōda reorganized the structure of 
the Cabinet Secretariat. He created five offices in charge of public rela-
tions, information and research, security affairs, internal affairs, and ex-
ternal affairs. MOFA bureaucrats were opposed to the establishment of 
the Cabinet Counsellors’ Office on External Affairs (Gaisei Shingishitsu), 
as they perceived it as a potential back channel for diplomacy. Eventually, 
however, Gotōda managed to force MOFA to cooperate (Shinoda 2007, 
pp. 33–36). The influential chief cabinet secretary skillfully used the new 
institutional tools to strengthen the prime minister’s control over foreign 
policy making, especially in the areas that required extensive interminis-
terial coordination.
Gotōda Masaharu faithfully supported Nakasone’s initiatives to 
strengthen the alliance with the US, but as a moderate politician he re-
acted whenever he thought that the prime minister exaggerated in his 
right–wing endeavors. For example, in 1987 he adamantly opposed MO-
FA’s plans to send patrol vessels and minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. 
Despite the fact that tankers transporting oil to Japan were endangered 
by hostilities between Iraq and Iran, Gotōda was determined to maintain 
a neutral stance in the conflict. He argued that sending Maritime Self–
Defense Forces to a war zone would lead to an infringement of Article 9 
of the constitution which prohibited Japan from waging wars. When Na-
kasone tried to forcefully submit this issue for cabinet’s approval, Gotōda 
warned that he would not put his signature under a decision to send mil-
itary ships abroad. Eventually, the prime minister listened to the advice 
from the chief cabinet secretary. Instead of sending forces to the Persian 
Gulf, Japan provided money for the creation of a navigation system that 
informed ships about dangers in the region (Gotōda 1989, pp. 104–108).
Although Gotōda can be considered as the most powerful chief cabinet 
secretary before the implementation of the central government reform, also 
other politicians who assumed this office managed to occasionally exert 
influence on diplomacy, especially if they had considerable experience in 
foreign policy making. For example, Miyazawa Kiichi, who served as chief 
cabinet secretary in the Suzuki government from 1980 to 1982, had ear-
lier been foreign minister under the Miki administration in 1974–1976. 
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Thanks to his vast knowledge of international matters and proficiency in 
English, Miyazawa enjoyed a special position vis–à–vis MOFA bureaucrats. 
In the summer of 1982 Japanese media reported that the Ministry of Edu-
cation recommended replacing expressions referring to the Sino–Japanese 
war in history textbooks with milder versions, which met with accusations 
from China and South Korea that Japan tried to whitewash its difficult 
history (Rose 1999, pp. 205–207). In order to solve this diplomatic crisis, 
Miyazawa issued a statement in August 1982, in which he promised that 
during textbook screenings in the future, the government would give con-
sideration to “building friendship and goodwill with neighboring countries” 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 1982). Thanks to this declaration he 
managed to alleviate protests by China and South Korea, but this interven-
tion in foreign policy making was criticized by LDP right–wing politicians, 
who argued that the Miyazawa statement infringed upon the principle of 
non–interference by other counties into Japan’s domestic affairs.
Another example of an influential chief cabinet secretary who left an 
important statement as his legacy was Kōno Yōhei under the Miyazawa 
cabinet in 1992–1993. In August 1993 Kōno, who would later become 
LDP leader and foreign minister, decided to issue a statement in which 
he apologized to the “comfort women” for the harm done by the Japanese 
Imperial Army. “Comfort women” (jūgun ianfu) signified women, mainly 
Koreans, who served as sexual slaves for Japanese soldiers during the Sec-
ond World War. When the truth about their difficult past started emerg-
ing as a serious problem in relations between Japan and South Korea at 
the beginning of the 1990s, the government in Tokyo ordered to conduct 
a comprehensive investigation on this issue. The documents that were 
found in ministerial archives confirmed that the army had been involved 
in the establishment and maintenance of “comfort stations,” though 
there were no written proofs that the military directly recruited women 
against their own will. Under these circumstances, LDP right–wing poli-
ticians adamantly opposed issuing any form of apologies. However, Kōno 
Yōhei was determined to redress the wrongdoings of Japan. He decided to 
accept the testimonies of former “comfort women” as decisive evidence 
and convinced Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi about the need for explicit 
apologies. In August 1993 he issued a statement, in which he extended 
“sincere apologies and remorse to all those, irrespective of place of origin, 
who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological 
wounds as comfort women.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 1993)
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The examples of Gotōda, Miyazawa and Kōno indicate that, depend-
ing on the situation, chief cabinet secretaries occasionally became impor-
tant decision makers in the sphere of external affairs. Especially in the 
case of matters that necessitated coordinated efforts by several ministries, 
ideological leanings of chief cabinet secretaries could tip the scales in favor 
of one decision or another, sometimes even contrary to the stance of the 
head of government or MOFA bureaucrats.
4. Foreign Ministers as MOFA Bureaucrats’ Bosses
Ministers of foreign affairs were, obviously, key persons in charge of 
Japanese diplomacy – just as prime ministers and chief cabinet secretar-
ies. However, their decision–making competences were subject to severe 
informal constraints. Due to the logic of frequent cabinet reshuffles, for-
eign ministers usually exchanged too frequently to be able to grasp full 
control over the issues dealt with by MOFA before stepping down from 
office. As a result, they often ended up being only passive executors of the 
plans instituted by their administrative staff.
The most powerful weapon that could be used by foreign ministers to 
gain leverage over MOFA bureaucrats was extensive experience in diplo-
macy and knowledge of international affairs. As this area of policy making 
could hardly assist politicians in gaining votes in their constituencies, 
the lawmakers were seldom interested in specializing in foreign affairs. 
Nevertheless, some of politicians served as foreign ministers long enough 
to gain much authority over their administrative subordinates. Among 
the most prominent examples one must mention Ōhira Masayoshi in 
1962–1964 and 1972–1974, Abe Shintarō in 1982–1986, as well as Kōno 
Yōhei in 1994–1996 and 1999–2001.
Thanks to his deep knowledge of international affairs, Ōhira Masa-
yoshi played a crucial role in supporting Prime Minister Tanaka’s efforts 
to normalize diplomatic relations with China in 1972. What helped him 
greatly was the fact that he had already served as foreign minister eight 
years earlier, and thus understood the vested interests of MOFA bureau-
crats. In 1962–1964 Ōhira supported Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato’s plans 
to establish semi–official exchange with the communist China. Thanks to 
Ikeda and Ōhira’s efforts, in 1962 Japan entered into the Liao–Takasaki 
agreement, which enabled initiating trade on a limited scale with the PRC 
(Sun 2007, pp. 57–59).
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Ōhira’s first attempt at rapprochement with Beijing eventually ended 
in failure due to the Cultural Revolution in China. Nevertheless, when 
Ōhira once again assumed the office of foreign minister in 1972, the in-
ternational environment was much more favorable to the idea of normal-
izing diplomatic relations with the PRC. Even though Ōhira constantly 
received threat letters and was afraid of an assassination attempt by right–
wing extremists, he was determined to overcome opposition by veto play-
ers (Tamura, Tomashima & Koeda 2000, pp. 168–169; Morita & Arai 
1982, p. 186). Before leaving for China, he wrote his last will and told 
his closest associates that in case of failure in the negotiations he would 
probably be unable to return to Japan (Wang 1996, p. 73). During talks 
in Beijing Prime Minister Tanaka, afraid of the reaction by nationalists in 
the LDP, tried to promote a weak version of apologies for war atrocities, 
by mentioning “causing troubles” to China during the war. This behavior, 
however, was harshly criticized by Mao Zedong. Eventually, it was Ōhira 
Masayoshi who in the last moment added words “deep remorse” to the 
treaty, thus exposing himself to protests from the Japanese right–wing 
radicals (Okada 2008, pp. 19–63).
Another foreign minister who managed to exert considerable influ-
ence on Japan’s diplomacy was Abe Shintarō. The mere fact that he served 
as foreign minister as long as four years, from 1982 to 1986, was excep-
tional. Thanks to his stable position in the government, Abe had enough 
time to build an extensive experience in international affairs and grasp 
control over MOFA bureaucrats. Moreover, Abe was a leader of the second 
largest faction in the LDP that had been established by his father, Prime 
Minister Kishi Nobusuke. Thanks to Abe’s strong position in the ruling 
party, Prime Minister Nakasone had no choice but to treat the foreign 
minister’s initiatives seriously.
Taking advantage of his extensive knowledge of foreign affairs, Abe 
Shintarō coined his own concept of a “creative diplomacy” (sōzōteki gai-
kō). As he explained, “creative diplomacy” was based on five principles:
1) Strengthening of cooperation with the free world;
2) Promotion of friendly relations with the neighboring countries in 
the Asia–Pacific region;
3) Development of mutual trust with the Eastern block;
4) Invigoration of the developing countries through economic ex-
change;
5) Initiatives for demilitarization and detente (Abe 1984a, p. 52).
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Abe explained that, while preserving basic rules of a non–military power, 
Japan should become more active on the international arena. He empha-
sized that Japan had to try to shape the international environment to its 
liking – that is promote peace and prosperity as well as defend democracy 
and freedom, without imposing forcefully these values on the others (Abe 
1984a, pp. 26–44). In order to realize his vision, Abe intensified visits 
abroad to the level that had not been achieved before by any Japanese 
foreign minister. While his efforts did not bring any spectacular results, 
the extent of Abe’s personal engagement in diplomacy was extraordinary. 
Staying in line with his principles, the Japanese foreign minister decisive-
ly condemned both the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Moreover, Abe used his exten-
sive connections with foreign diplomats to appeal for peace in the Middle 
East during visits to both Iraq and Iran in 1983. Additionally, he actively 
participated in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, held in 1984, 
where he strongly appealed for the renunciation of all nuclear bomb tests 
(Abe 1984b, pp. 8–206).
Kōno Yōhei held the post of foreign minister as long as Abe, though 
his term in office was divided into two parts – from 1994 to 1996 and 
from 1999 to 2001. Due to the fact that in 1993–1995 Kōno was concur-
rently the LDP leader (the first one who never became prime minister), 
and in 1994–1995 he additionally served as vice–premier, the extent of his 
power in the government and the largest ruling party was considerable. 
As a moderate politician, he fully supported Prime Minister Murayama’s 
efforts to apologize East Asian countries for war atrocities on the occasion 
of the 50th anniversary of Japan’s surrender in 1995.
While under the Murayama cabinet Kōno’s political convictions 
matched the ideological leaning of the head of government, under the 
Mori cabinet (2000–2001) Kōno became conflicted over diplomatic strate-
gy with the prime minister. The most exemplary was his opposition to the 
visit to Japan by former Taiwanese President Lee Teng–hui. Kōno Yōhei 
belonged to a pro–Beijing group in the LDP and was determined to avoid 
any decisions that could jeopardize relations with the PRC. The Japa-
nese foreign minister argued that despite the fact that Lee was no longer 
head of the state, his visit would be inevitably accompanied by a political 
context. Kōno Yōhei admitted, however, that it was extremely difficult to 
block this initiative, because it was Prime Minister Mori who personally 
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insisted on issuing a  Japanese visa to the former Taiwanese president2. 
Nevertheless, Kōno used all of his influence to prevent the visit. Lee Teng–
hui wanted to participate in a  Japan–Taiwan symposium in Nagano in 
October 2000, but MOFA refused to give permission for this plan.
The situation changed in the last weeks of Mori’s term in office. Hav-
ing nothing to lose after announcing his resignation in the nearest future, 
the prime minister was determined to invite Lee Teng–hui to Japan in 
April 2001. Kōno Yōhei tried to convince Mori against this idea together 
with another pro–Beijing politician, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Ya-
suo. Nevertheless, MOFA bent to pressure from the pro–Taiwan faction 
and issued a Japanese visa to the former Taiwanese president. In the last 
moment, however, Kōno Yōhei warned Mori that he would step down 
from office if the visit took place. Eventually, due to Kōno’s protest, Mori 
agreed to severely restrain Lee Teng–hui’s activities in Japan. The former 
Taiwanese president was prohibited from delivering policy speeches and 
from leaving the region that he planned to visit. As a result, Lee Teng–hui 
was only allowed to be subjected to heart treatment in a hospital in Kura-
shiki (Żakowski 2012, pp. 296–297).
The examples of Ōhira, Abe and Kōno confirm that not all foreign 
ministers were ignorant of the affairs of their ministry. At the moment 
of assuming this important office some of politicians had already boasted 
extensive skills and knowledge of international matters, or they served 
as foreign ministers long enough to grasp considerable command over 
their administrative staff. As a result, they were able to occasionally exert 
a strong influence on the direction of foreign policy of Japan.
5. Conclusion
Cabinet members in Japan have been often depicted as mere puppets 
in the hands of the bureaucrats and influential ruling party figures. With-
out denying strong influence of veto players on decision–making, I tried 
to give several examples that even under the old system before the central 
government reform, prime ministers, chief cabinet secretaries and foreign 
ministers were occasionally able to succeed in conducting relatively inde-
pendent foreign policy making. The heads of government could take ad-
vantage of their connections with the bureaucrats and LDP backbenchers, 
2 Author’s interview with Kōno Yōhei, Tokyo, March 13, 2009.
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or they could force both veto players to cooperate through appealing for 
public support. The chief cabinet secretaries’ main instrument of power 
were their interministerial coordination abilities. The foreign ministers, 
in turn, could exert considerable influence on decision making if they pos-
sessed extensive knowledge and expertise in foreign affairs. 
Perhaps the most important factor, however, was coherence of the ac-
tivities of all three main political actors. As shown by Gotōda’s opposition 
to sending Self–Defense Forces to the Persian Gulf and by Kōno’s protest 
against issuing a visa to Lee Teng–hui, difference of opinions between the 
prime minister and chief cabinet secretary or foreign minister could cause 
postponement or even renunciation of controversial diplomatic initia-
tives. In this light, determination in pursuing harmonized policy goals by 
the three political decision makers seemed to be a necessary prerequisite 
for the success of all difficult foreign policy endeavors. 
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